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THE

MODERN THEORY AND PRACTICE
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

OF

INTRODUCTION

Antenuptial agreements are just one aspect of family law,
but especially important due to the lack of a specifically stated
theory of law underlying such agreements and due to their
importance as an area in which the marriage partners may
exercise at least a modicum of control over this most intimate
contract which may well be the most important legal relationship either party shall ever enter.
The crux of many of the difficulties in family law is a lack
of common understanding as to exactly what the marital relation is meant to be. What is needed is a comprehensive legal
definition of marriage. As a functional definition for the purposes of this comment marriage is defined as follows: marriage
is a legally created and sanctioned voluntary relationship between a man and a woman whereby each undertakes a complex
of rights and duties in regard to the other, which rights and
duties may only be diminished or abrogated with the consent
of the state and in accordance with the law. An antenuptial
agreement is an agreement entered into before marriage with
the expressed or implied consent of the state and in accordance
with law that diminishes or abrogates certain of the rights and
duties of the marital relationship and may also create new
rights and duties between the parties that would not have
otherwise existed.
The marital relation itself may be said to be a contract,
albeit a very special contract,' which creates a status 2 in which
the state has a direct interestA The state, recognizing that the
marital relation is essential to a stable family unit and that a
stable family unit is necessary for the state itself to function,
' The difference between the marriage itself as a contract and other
contracts made in regard to that marriage is pointed out in Comment, An
Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts, 47 N. C. L. REv. 815
(1968):
The marriage contract is the marriage itself with the rights and duties
incident to that relationship; whereas, the marital contract is a con-

tractual obligation between the husband and wife that may bear upon
the marital relationship but which is not the marriage itself. Id. at 816.
2 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1944).
3 This is because the validity of the marriage itself as well as the nature of the marital status is a matter of state law and not of private contract. See, Estate of Duncan, 87 Colo. 149, 285 P. 757 (1930) ; Watson v.
Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906) ; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan.
507, 44 P. 1 (1896) ; Garlock v. Garlock 279 N Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939);
Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431,114 N.W. 820 (1908).
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takes upon itself the role of a third party to the marriage con-

tract. 4 This extends to include the state as a third party to any
contract directly relating to the marital relationship, including
antenuptial agreements, marriage settlements, widows' allowances, separation agreements, and property settlements.5 The
state is a full party to such proceedings and as such demands
that they include a fair consideration for the state's concerns,
viz. the continued viability of the family unit system and the
support and welfare of its citizens.8
Even if it is now presumed that women can contract as
the complete legal equals of men, even in regard to certain
factors of their marital rights with those men,7 the state's
interest in the marital relation still exists." A marriage is

assumed to eventually result in children who will be dependent
for an extended period of time on just those parties to the
marriage relation, the children's mother and father. The state
assumes it to be to the child's advantage that the parents live
together amicably and that they be productive to the degree
necessary to secure the child's wants without making demands
upon the state." The parents have the primary responsibility
Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908)
; Barham v. Barham, 33 Cal. 2d 416, 202 P.2d 289 (1949); Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont.
486. 167 P.2d 848 (.1946) ; Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521
(1939); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961) ; Estate of
ValliSh, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124,
42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
5 N. KOHUT, THERAPEUTIC FAMILY LAW - A COMPLETE GUIDE TO MAlI4

TAL RECONCILIATIONS, 28-29 (1968), in which the feeling of the courts was

shown generallv to be that what is best for society is also what is best for
the family, leading to the imposition on the parties to the marital relation of
cetain obligations by both natural and civil laws.
I 6 The courts show a great abhorrance for antenuptial or marital contracts that tend to encourage the separation of the parties or indicate that
the parties do not intend to abide by the legal requirements of their status.
This attitude is seen in such cases as the following: Williams v. Williams,
29: Ariz. '538, 243 P.'402 (1926) : Estate of Duncan, 87 Colo. 149, 285 P. 757
(1930); Kalsem v. Froland, 207 Iowa 994,.222 N.W. 3 (1928); Cohn v.
Cohn, 209 Md, 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); In re Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, 111
N.W. 305 (1907).

. 7 See

LINDEY,

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND

ANTENUPTIAL

CONTRACTS,

§90 (1964), (hereinafter cited as LINDY). At common law the marriage
would have extinguished existing contracts between the husband and wife.
.8 The state's special interest in the marital rights, or personal rights, of
a 'party as opposed to property rights is made clear in Comment, A "Check
List" for the Drafting of Enforceable Antenuptial Agreements, 19 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 615' (1965):

Thus, prospective spouses may release their respective [property]
rights by way of dower, homestead, or distributive share in the estate
of the other.
On the other hand, there are certain personal rights and duties which
may not lawfully be contracted away by means of an antenuptial agreement. Thus, for example, an antenuptial promise to reside in a particular location, to raise the issue of the marriage according to the
teachings of a particular religion, to refrain from cohabitation or to
exclude the issue of a previous marriage from the new household will be
considered void and unenforceable against the contracting spouse. Id.
at 629-30.
9 Drinan, The Rights of Chitdren in Modern American Family Law; in
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for the support of the child, and indeed each member of the
family unit is responsible for the support and welfare of the
other members to some extent. This is especially seen in the
husband's responsibility toward wife and child, though it is
equally true that the wife bears responsibility to the husband
and child, 10 and that the child later may bear some responsibility
for the support of his parents.1
The state looks to'the family unit as the means to secure the
continued welfare of its citizens by making them legally responsible to each other within the family unit. The state thus could
be said to allocate a portion of its responsibility for the welfare
of its citizens to the individual members of the family by virtue
of the marriage contract.12 The entire structure of the interresponsible relationships stems from the marriage contract,
and the marriage contract itself represents the allocation of the
state's responsibility.
With the rising frequency of second marriages, whether
due to the death of a prior spouse, divorce or annulment, the
need for some method of modifying the marital rights becomes
pressing.", As is the case throughout contract law, it becomes
a question of balancing one value or goal against another - a
weighing of prerogatives: the interests of the state as a party
to the marriage contract and the right of the man and woman
to freely contract with each other concerning their rights and
obligations to one another."
In every state of the United States some manner of anteCHILDREN IN THE COURTS -

THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION, 94-104 (G.

Newman ed. 1969), wherein the continuing rights of the children, as well as
the parents, due to the familial relationship are listed to show that many of
those rights will continue even after the formal marriage relation between
the husband and wife has terminated.
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§2-11, 10-2 (1965).
The wife is under a duty
to support the husband only if he is shown to be actually dependent on her.
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§10-1 et seq. (1965).
Statutory support provisions for relatives.
12 This proceeds from the idea that the state becomes a third party to
the antenuptial agreement in order to protect its own interests, which are
entrusted to a degree to the husband and wife as they enter the marriage.
The state does not wish to see the marriage so watered down by prior agreements between the parties that it no longer represents the best interest of
one or more of the parties to the marriage, the state being one of those
parties. The cases cited in note 4 supra, are in unanimous agreement as
to the importance of the role of the state as a third party in the allocation
of marital rights and obligations.
13 Between 1960 and 1967 the annual divorces per 1,000 married women
aged 15 and older rose from 9.2 to 11.2. In 1967 alone more than a million
adults were involved in divorce actions, with more than 700,000 children being
affected by divorce decrees in that year. THE NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIC ALMANAC 1971, 376 (L. Foster, ed., 1970).
'4 The balancing processes used by the courts may be seen in the following cases where the court faced the problem of conflicting goals: In re
Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962); Englund v. Englund, 286
Minn. 227, 175 N.W.2d 461 (1970) ; Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla.
Sup. Ct. 1960) ; and others cited in this article.
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nuptial agreement is permitted 15 and usually looked upon with
much favor. 6 But because of the vital balancing process mentioned above, the parties are very much limited in the rights
they may surrender and in the manner in which they may waive
those rights. 17 The demands of the state concerning the welfare
of family members still must be met, although the parties will
be permitted to vary to some degree the manner in which those
ends are reached. 18
This interest of the state is practically an absolute.' 9 No
antenuptial agreement will be enforced if its effect would be to
so pauperize one party as to make him or her dependent on the
state for welfare. 20 But that does not mean that a rich man
must necessarily make his wife equally rich in her own right.
The state only demands that she be provided for in a reasonable
fashion, which if both prospective spouses agree, could mean
that upon his death the wife would receive only a small portion
of his net worth, or even none of his wealth at all, depending
upon the circumstances.'
THE

SIX GENERAL TYPES OF ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

Antenuptial agreements may be divided into two categories
as to the subject matter with which they deal: those that treat
15

Hayes, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Antenuptial Agree-

ments, ILL. B. J. 212 (1953).

16 Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928) ; Pereira v.
Pereira. 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App.
157, 216 P. 92 (1923) ; Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355
(1906); Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946); Sanger
v. Sanger, 132 Kan. 596, 296 P. 355 (1931) ; Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y.
337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939).
17 The courts in general are very watchful inasmuch as by making the
agreement the parties are in effect taking upon themselves some of the
powers of the state and the court as they define the legal rights and duties
that shall exist between them.
18See, e.q.. Hessick v. Hessick, 169 Ill. 486, 48 N.E. 712 (1897) ; Mines
v. Phee, 254 I1. 60, 98 N.E. 260 (1912): Murdock v. Murdock, 219 Ill. 123,
76 N.E. 57 (1905); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1962) ; Schulz v. Foz, 136 Mont. 152, 345 P.2d 1045 (1959).
19 No state court is ever likely to rule that it has no interest in the
marital relation or that the parties may avoid the court's supervision over
any particular aspect of the marital relation which may affect the stability
of that marriage. The very basis of the law of domestic relations is the
state's interest in the marital relationship between the parties which was
recognized by the state's laws with the state then defining the general
nature
of the marital status itself.
20 In re Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138. 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964) ; Watson
v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548 77 N.E. 355 (1906) ; Gartner v. Gartner, 246
Minn. 319, 74 N.W.2d 809 1956); In re McClellan, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d
595 (1950) ; In re Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968).
21 If all the conditions required by the court are met, even i grossly
disproportionate share may be enforced. Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468, 148
N.E. 323 (1925); Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
1970). See also Cantor v. Cantor, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 174 N.E.2d 304
(1959) ; In re Knippel, 7 Wis. 2d 335, 96 N.W.2d 514 (1959).
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property rights of the parties in the property of either spouse,22

and those that treat the right of a spouse to support during
and after the termination of the marriage.2 8 These two categories may be further broken down into three subcategories as

to the time at which the antenuptial agreement will come into
noticeable effect: those to come into effect during the marriage,'
those to take effect upon the divorce or separation,2 5 and those
26
to take effect at death.
The only types of antenuptial agreements that would be

almost universally enforceable are those made in regard to
property rights during the marriage of the parties27 and in regard to property interests of the survivor upon the death of a
spouse.28 The other categories are open to much debate and
make up a rather unsettled portion of family law.- Movement
in this area seems to be on an ad hoc basis with the courts
paying primary attention to the equities of the case directly
before them. 0 The primary concern of the lawyer then is to be
able to predict the limits to which the court may be willing to
go when given a compelling set of equities. Policy declarations
of the court as indicative of new trends provide the most reliable guide, as the issue is ultimately based on public policy.
22Lindsav v. Lind.ay, 163 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
Eubanks v. Euhanks. 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); In re Borton,
393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1964).
23 Herman v. Goetz. 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969); Schulz v. Fox, 136
Mont. 152. 345 P.2d 1045 (1959).

24 Seuss v. Scbukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934) ; Herman v. Goetz,
204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969) ; Talley v. Harris, 199 Okla. 47, 182 P.2d
765 (1947).
25 Britven v. Britven. 259 Iowa 650, 145 N.W.2d 450 (1966) ; Neddo v.
Neddo. 56 Kan. 507, 44 P.1 (1896); Cohn v. Cohn. 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d
704 (1956); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa Sup. Ct 1970).
28 Colbert v. Rings, 231 Ill. 404, 83 N.E. 274 (1907): Kroell v. Kroell.
219 Ill.
105, 76 N.E. 63 (1905); In re Spieth, 181 Neb. 11, 146 N.W.2d 746
(1966) : In re Rosciolo. 434 Pa. 461, 258 A.2d 623 (1969).
27 Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Kv. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916): Hillman v.
Hillman, 69 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1947), aff'd mem., 273 App. Div. 960, 79
N.Y.S.2d 325 (1948); Belsky v. Belsky, 196 Pa. Super. 374, 175 A.2d 348
(1961): Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594. 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964).
28 Geizer v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935); Yarde v. Yarde,
187 Ill. 636, 58 N.E. 600 (1900) ; Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1970).
29Among the symptoms of this unsettled condition are the conflicting
case law within a single jurisdiction, reliance by the court on the particular
facts of the case before it rather than on a general principle of established
law, and the failure to have a decisive utterance on some aspects of antenuptial agreements dealing with the divorce and/or death of the parties.
Among the causes for this uncertainty may be the changing divorce laws
and family law concepts in many areas coupled with a fear by the court
that its decision may prove disruptive to the family unit ideal if made
generally applicable.
80 Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Lindsay v.
Lindsay, 163 So. 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273
N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Reiling v. Reiling, 474 P.2d 327 (Ore.
Sup. Ct. 1970); Estate of Borton, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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The following is an analysis of the six types of antenuptial
agreements:
1. Those agreements to take effect during the marriage
affecting the property rights of the parties." This is a usually
accepted method by which each party may retain exclusive control over property acquired by him or her before the marriage
or other property acquired during the marriage but held in his
or her own name,3 2 as well as the rents or proceeds from such
property. Such an agreement might include property given to
one spouse by the other in consideration of the marriage83 The
parties may also agree to hold certain property jointly.1
2. Those agreements to take effect after the death of one
spouse affecting property rights of the parties.3 5 Upon the
death of either party to the marital relation the marriage itself
is of course over and the state no longer need concern itself
with its continued viability. This is a method by which the
parties may agree that upon the death of the other the surviving spouse shall take only the agreed interest in the deceased's
estate and not make a claim upon the estate to the full limits
of the statutory allowance.8 6 The adequacy of the agreement
is determined as of the time it was executed.'7
3. Those agreements to take effect upon the divorce or
separation of the spouses affecting their respective property
rights. 8 This type of agreement is viewed more critically by
the courts inasmuch as it tends to improperly influence the
continuance of the marital relation between the parties. 9 That
is, if the agreement calls for a large property settlement to the
wife upon divorce, she may be tempted to bring about the
conditions of that divorce in order to avail herself of the settlement. Conversely, if the settlement is small, she may put
up with practically intolerable abuse from her husband, reasoning that she would lose a substantial property interest if
divorced and forced to rely on the paltry property allowance
a' LINDEY, §90.
Collins v. Phillips, 259 Ill. 405, 102 N.E. 796 (1913); Edwards v.
Martin, 39 Ill. App. 145 (1890) ; Geiger v. Merle 360 IH. 497, 196 N.E. 497
(1935); In re Strickland 181 Neb. 478, 149 R.W.2d 344 (1967); In re
Davis, 20 N.Y.2d 70, 28 N.Y.S.2d 767, 228 N.E.2d 768 (1967).
33 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
34 McMullen v. McMullen, 185 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
85Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Johnson
32

v. Johnson, 140 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); In re Moore, 210 Ore. 23,
307 P.2d 483 (1957).
86 Edwards v. Martin, 39 Il1. App. 145 (1891); Wetsel v. Firebaugh,
258 Ill. 404, 101 N.E. 602 (1913).
37 Clark v. Clark, 201 Okla. 134 202 P.2d (1949).
88 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
39 Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Reiling v.
Reiling, 474 P.2d 327 (Ore. Sup. Ct. (1970).
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to which she had agreed.

0

In the example above, the situation

would be the reverse for the husband who in the case of a large
property settlement agreement would tend to suffer abuse from
his wife, while with a more modest settlement might be tempted

to force her into a divorce.4 1

In considering the enforceability

of such agreements the courts will look to which party was at

fault in regard to the divorce, at least in those states where
fault is still a factor in the granting of a divorce. 42 It is apparent then that such an agreement may provide a mechanism by

which one party to the marriage may gain an unfair advantage
over the other throughout the course of their marriage. 43 Waivers of dower in such situations are usually upheld, however."
4. Those agreements to take effect during the marriage
of the parties affecting the support of a spouse.45 By such

agreement the man usually tries to have his prospective spouse
agree to a periodic stipend or allowance in lieu of any other
support over the course of the marriage. The courts take a
dim view of such agreements since the conditions of the parties
may change drastically over the period of a marriage, which is
designed to be a lifetime contract. ° Here, as in number 3
above, one party, usually the husband, may gain an unfair advantage over the other by threatening to stand by the agreement, forcing the wife to support herself with what has turned
out to be a completely inadequate allotment. It is also conceivable that if the allowance is very large the husband could
find himself at a disadvantage if unable to meet the payments.
For the courts to enforce such agreements would tend to disrupt
the marriage all the more. It seems that only in rare situations where the parties are financially independent of one an40 Watson v. Watson. 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906).
41 See. Britven v. Britven, 259 Iowa 650, 145 N.W.2d 450 (1966);
Neddo V. Neddo. 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896), Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470.
121 A.2d 704 (1956); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d (Iowa Sup. Ct. 368 1970).
42 Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970); York v.
Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882).
No fault divorce law is in effect in California and attempts have been
made to pass similar legislation in other states, notably Illinois, where up to
now it has failed to be passed. Under such a law there is no "guilty" party
in the divorce action, with the only cause for divorce being that the parties
to the marriage had irreconcilable differences.
43 French v. French, 70 Cal. App. 2d 755, 161 P.2d 687 (1945) ; Sanders
v. Sanders,
288 v.S.W.2d
(Tenn. App. 1955).
4 Colbert
Rings,473
231 I1. 404, 83 N.E. 274 (1907); Kroell v. Kroell,
219 Ill. 105, 76 N.E. 63 (1905) ; In re Spieth. 181 Neb. 11, 146 N.W.2d 746
(1966) ; In re Rosciolo, 434 Pa. 461, 258 A.2d 623 (1969).
46 Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Bauer v.
Bauer;,464 P.2d 710 (Ore. App. 1970).
4"Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906).
In this
case the wife had been crippled at the time of the marriage and the court
held that the duty of supporting her fell entirely on the husband regardless
of any contract between the parties.
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other could such an agreement be fairly countenanced by the
courts.
5. Those agreements to take effect after the death of a
spouse affecting the support of the surviving spouse. 4' This is
much like number 2 above, since support in this context means
a property distribution from the estate of the deceased spouse. 48
Such agreements include the specific waiver of rights in the
estate of the other spouse. Such waivers are usually upheld
even though it is obvious at the time that the party can ill
afford to lose such rights. 49 The courts look to the time the
agreement was made to be sure that all the requirements of
validity were present, but without a showing of some inequity
at that time, the agreement will stand.
It seems somehow paradoxical, inasmuch as the courts
critically view agreements that waive support upon divorce or
separation, that agreements such as these should meet with
favor.50 In the case of either divorce or death the marriage
itself becomes defunct, and the most important remaining consideration is the continued welfare of the parties. In the case
of divorce the husband is still alive, and it is usually he who is
obligated for the continued support of his ex-spouse. Perhaps
it may be said that a divorce may end the domestic relation
but will not be allowed to end the contractual aspects that the
state has read into the marriage, one of these being mutual
support of each spouse until this primary obligation is assumed by another, as through remarriage.
Upon the death of a spouse it is no longer possible to look
to that spouse's personal earnings from labor for support, but
his property still exists, and his estate may still have an income.
The point is that to be consistent it seems that courts should
realize that some obligation to support the surviving husband
or wife exists even after death, and that obligation should be
met by the deceased's estate. This is the primary purpose of
dower and statutory allowances. Thus here there may be seen a
rather subtle inconsistency in that waiver of dower and statutory
allowances is in reality a waiver of support rights as well as
property rights. Dower especially is commonly said to be a life
Moats v. Moats, 450 P.2d 64 (Colo Sup. Ct. 1969).
Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ; Posner
v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Sup Ct. 1970). An analogy could be made
to a divorce decree in which separate allotments are made for property settlement and for support. On the other hand, this in itself could be looked
upon as a means of assuring a spouse the means of support whether by
assuring the spouse property which could be used as a means of support in
itself or through actual support payments.
49 Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935); Yarde v. Yarde,
187 Ill. 636, 53 N.E. 600 (1900).
50 Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906).
47

48
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interest in one-third of the dead spouse's real property, which
would indicate it is meant to be in the nature of support.
6. Those agreements to take effect upon the divorce or
separation of the spouses affecting their support rights and
obligations to one another. With very few exceptions 51 the
courts uniformly reject such agreements as inimical to the
family and to interspousal relationships. 2

But why should

this be so? It is easy to understand that the parties should be
obligated to support their offspring until such children can
support themselves and that even upon the breakup of the
marriage the rights of dependent children subsist in the original marital contract and cannot be avoided. The question of
custody is then primarily a question of where the child's interests will be best served. It is obvious that both parents are
bound to support such children, though it is not so obvious as
to why they should be bound for an indefinite time after the
marriage to support one another.
A possible argument might be that the division of labor
in the average household makes the wife unfit for any but
domestic duties, that she has forfeited her opportunities of
gaining advantages of self-support in reliance on her husband's
acknowledged duties to provide for her indefinitely into the
future3 Upon the divorce itself the wife may forego provisions for alimony, as many women now do. But the possibility of alimony is still there. As the right to support cannot
be waived, the husband usually is somewhat at a marital disadvantage since a divorce will involve the risk of splitting his
income between his wife and himself in the maintenance of two
households.
It seems that upon marriage the parties are presumed to
agree to share a common standard of living and this agreement
continues even after a divorce. 54 Perhaps also it could be
51 Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So. 2d 9 (1942); Hudson v. Hudson,
350 P.2d 596 (Okla. Sup Ct. 1960).
52Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896); Cohn v. Cohn, 209
Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); In re Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, 11 N.W.
805 (1907).

58 In general most of the courts see the woman as being in a less capable
position to support herself after the termination of the marital relation

than the man, sometimes pointing to the fact that the woman usually has
only marginal job skills at best. However, it now seems that prior to the

marriage an equality of bargaining position is presumed to exist between

the parties, everything else being equal, either because of statute or court

ruling. See Kuhnen v. Kuhnen, 351 Ill. 591, 184 N.E. 874 (1933); Martin
v. Collison, 266 Ill. 172, 107 N.E. 257 (1914); Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala.
288, 112 So. 2d 451 (1959); Baugher v. Barrett, 128 Ind. App. 233, 145

N.E.2d 297 (1957); In re Brown, 189 Kan. 193, 368 P.2d 27 (1962); In re
Harris 7 Wis. 2d 417, 96 N.W.2d 718 (1959).
5
r. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC

REMLTIONS, 179-89 (1931), and cases cited therein.
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looked upon as a veiled threat to the principal provider for
the family that he must not let his position of financial dominance lead him to overstepping the rights of the other spouse.
In effect, then, the concept of alimony may be a means of assuring the rights of a dependent spouse to equate the status
of the spouses during the marital relationship. To allow them
to agree prior to marriage that no alimony award should ever
be made or to limit it to a definite amount would destroy this
function.
Though not usually articulated by the courts, the function
of alimony is not solely to provide for the welfare of a spouse
after their separation but to deter the possibility of the separation in the first place by guaranteeing them common living
standards. Some courts point to the fact that a large alimony
settlement agreed to in an antenuptial agreement would encourage divorce, while a very small agreed settlement would
prevent an innocent party from prosecuting a divorce even
when good grounds were present and he or she would otherwise
do so, for fear of losing an adequate means of support. In the
first instance, a viable marriage is jeopardized due to the lure
of the big settlement; in the second case, an intolerable marital
relation is suffered due to the fear of an inadequate post
marital arrangement. In either case the agreement has an
untoward influence on the marriage, giving one spouse or the
other an advantage. By guaranteeing common living standards even after a divorce one of the possible motives for a
spouse forcing a divorce on his or her partner is removed.
In general, then, there is a strong prejudice against enforcing that portion of an antenuptial agreement dealing with
the rights of a spouse upon the dissolution of the marriage
through divorce. Some courts hold that since the divorce destroys the marriage it also renders the antenuptial agreement
ineffective. Other courts seem to hold that the inclusion in the
agreement of stipulations concerning divorce renders that part
of the agreement void as against public policy, or as showing
the bad faith of the parties upon entering the agreement. Still
other courts find that there has been a failure of the consideration for the agreement upon the divorce, making the antenuptial agreement unenforceable. The most commonly given reason is that the duty to support the spouse is imposed by law,
and the other spouse will not be permitted to shed this responbility which is not an obligation to the husband or wife alone
but also an obligation to the state. 55
55 See cases cited in note 27 8upra.
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INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES

In addition to the six general types of agreements, a prospective spouse may assent to the interest of a third person in
the property of the other party and agree that such interest is
to be maintained even after the marriage. 8 This may be especially useful to protect the interests of a child by a prior
marriage, siblings, parents or grandparents in the property
of either party by giving such third persons a right enforceable at law or in equity. This may be done in such a way as to
make the antenuptial agreement irrevocable as to that third
7
party's interest without his consent.

Third parties themselves may directly enter into antenuptial agreements with one or both of the spouses.5 8 Of course,
such agreements made in the contemplation of marriage must
usually meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. 59 Third

persons, such as relatives of a pregnant bride, may assume certain obligations, such as support, toward one of the prospective
spouses or toward the children of the marriage, though this
will not relieve either spouse of his or her duties toward the
other or toward a child if the third party should fail to perform. 0 The marriage itself may serve as a valid consideration
for any antenuptial agreement, indeed even a promise of marriage may be sufficient.62
PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH JOINT EFFORTS

Special arrangement may be made in a separate part of
the antenuptial agreement for the disposition of property acquired during the marriage, that is, property which both parties worked to obtain. The parties may agree that such property should pass completely to the survivor of the two, or that
upon the death of one, one-half should pass to his estate and
the other half to the surviving spouse.6 2 The point to be made
is that for such property both spouses will likely feel that they
have earned an interest, regardless of whether they hold the
title to it jointly, as opposed to property which each had earned
56 Baughman v. Baughman, 283 Ill. 55, 119 N.E. 49 (1918); Geiger v.

Merle, 860 Ill. 497, 196 N.E. 497 (1935).
57 Turner v. Black, 19 Ill. 2d 296, 166 N.E.2d 588 (1960); Dean v.
Jelama, 316 P.2d 599 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1957).
58 Specht v. Richter, 258 Ill. App. 22 (1930).
59
6o

2 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON- CONTRACTS §462 (4th ed. 1950).

Specht v. Richter, 258 Ill. App. 22 (1930); Wright v. Wright, 114
Iowa 748, 87 N.W. 709 (1901); French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195
N.E. 714 (1935); Kovler v. Vagenheim, 333 Mass. 252, 130 N.E.2d 557
(1955). These cases make it clear that the antenuptial agreement would
probably be void to the extent that it actually tried to relieve the husband
of his legal responsibility to support his wife.
61 Note 60 supra.
62

In re Taylor, 205 Kan. 847, 469 P.2d 437 (1970).
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separately and brought independently to the marital relation.

THE ILLINOIS

LAW

The Illinois courts express a general approbation for antenuptial agreements. The primary requirement is that the
spouse know what rights he or she is surrendering and willingly surrenders those rights.63 The reasoning is that one
may not be said to have given up a claim to such rights
without knowing that such a claim existed, or the extent of
that claim. Following from this reasoning is the Illinois courts'
emphasis on full disclosure to each spouse of the extent of the
other spouse's wealth.0
Of course, substitutes for actual personal disclosure by spouse to spouse may be found, as for instance where the wife has learned by independent though reliable means of the extent of her prospective husband's holdings
and this information was accurate and was in fact relied upon.
The important element is that the spouse knew of the value of
the right she surrendered at the time she surrendered it and
that she intended the result contained in the agreement.6 5 The
wording of the agreement itself is examined for evidence of
6
the actual intent of the parties.2
In Illinois a confidential or fiduciary relationship is presumed to exist between couples engaged to be married. 67 An
antenuptial agreement between engaged persons then is not
made at arm's length.6S When a dispute arises over the agreement the burden is on the challenged party to demonstrate
that a full disclosure of wealth had been made. The contrary
is true when the agreement is between persons not engaged
to marry. For such a couple, an arm's length or business type
relationship is presumed. This pragmatic approach to marriage results in placing the burden of proof that there was not
G3 Genung v. Hagemann, 103 Ill. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
64 Guhi v. Guhi, 376 I1l. 100, 33 N.E.2d 185 (1941); Megginson v.

Megglnson 367 Ill. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815 (1937); Hessick v. Hessick, 169 1l1.
486, 48 N.9~. 712 (1897) ; Davis v. Davis, 196 Ark. 57, 116 S.W.2d 607 (1938) ;

Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S.W.2d 937 (1935); Rolfe v. Rolfe, 125
Me. 82, 130 A. 877 (1925) ; Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945) ;
Davis v. Davis , 258 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1970) ; Bibelhausen
v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 159 N.W. 516 (1915.)
65 Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468, 148 N.E. 323 (1925) ; Slater v. Slater,
310 Ill. 454, 142 N.E. 177 (1923); Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So.

2d 451 (1959); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962); In re
McCready. 316
66 Genung
Compare with
67 Achilles

Pa. 246, 175 A. 554 (1934).
v. Hagemann, 103 Ill. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
In re Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N.W. 305 (1907).
v. Achilles, 137 Ill. 589, 28 N.E. 45 (1891); Kuhnen v.

Kuhnen 351 Ill. 591, 184 N.E. 874 (1933); Martin v. Collison, 266 Ill. 172,
107 NE 257 (1914) ; Petru v. Petru 4 Ill. App. 2d 1, 123 N.E.2d 352 (1955);
Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N.E. 34 (1915).
68 Id.
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full disclosure on the party challenging the agreement. With
older couples seeking primarily companionship and financial
security this approach is not so unrealistic as it might sound
for a passionate and impetuous pair of young lovers. It is
important here to note that the modern courts in general and
the Illinois courts in particular view the marital relation in
light of the situation of the parties and their private goals and
needs rather than as a static and invariant arrangement. However, all courts demand that it be a marriage in fact and that
the more basic rights and duties of the spouses cannot be
abrogated. The major point to be ascertained is which rights
and duties are so basic that the parties cannot reach them by
mutual agreement, and which are not.
By means of an antenuptial agreement the rights of ownership in property acquired before the marriage may be retained exclusive of the other spouse. Though it seems this
property could be reached if necessary for support, property
rights as such would not vest in the other spouse either during
the marriage or after the death of the other spouse. Agreement could also be made as to property acquired during the
marriage itself, though in this area there would have to be an
acknowledgment of the rights of the spouse in the original
acquisition of such property. Property rights in general are
not so basic to the marital relationship as to be beyond the
reasonable control of the parties themselves6 9
An area less clear relates to agreements as to the disposition of property upon the divorce of the parties. It would seem
that an agreement that property acquired before or during
the marriage by a single spouse may be held exclusive of the
rights of the other spouse, would preclude that spouse upon
divorce or separation from making direct demands on such
property. However, if the agreement dealt specifically with
the consequences of divorce or separation so as to affect the
character of the marriage by giving one party the financial
advantage over the other in case of divorce, the agreement
would be looked at less favorably. If the prospect of divorce
were to be either particularly beneficial or specially detrimental to one party as opposed to another, then such agreement
would not be enforced.70 This is not because of its effect on
property rights so much as because of its effect on the marital
relation itself, causing that relationship to be other than it is
contemplated by law by putting one party at a legal disadvan69
Long v. Barton, 236 Ill. 551, 86 N.E. 127 (1908), wherein it was
held that taking the agreed amount in lieu of dower upon divorce waived
the right to assert dower as a claim later on.
70 Ehlers v. Ehlers, 259 Ill. App. 142 (1930).
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tage in regard to the other, forcing the one to risk more than
the other in case of a divorce or separation."
After the death
of a spouse such a possibility would no longer appertain to the
agreement, and it could then be fully enforcable.
Perhaps most basic of all elements to marriage in a legal
sense are the mutual obligations of support between the spouses.
It is understandable then that the Illinois courts,, as well as
most other courts, do not look with favor on agreements waiving or impairing these obligations. To do so would allow the
parties to alter the basic nature of the legal status of being
married and make of marriage something other than that which
is countenanced by law.
There are few Illinois cases specifically dealing with the
waiver of rights to support during or after the termination of
the marriage. There could be a number of reasons for this.
The parties themselves may not seek to enforce such agreements through the court process. Both spouses may have been
adequately provided for in other ways, reaching an amicable
agreement as to support duties without the need for adjudication of their agreement. It also may be that each party realizes
the doubtful enforceability of such agreements and relies primarily on the other spouse's not challenging it, and when it is
challenged, not undertaking the extra expense of an appeal.
If the wife, for instance, were well provided for under the
agreement, it might be senseless for her to appeal an order
affirming it. It is just such an equitable agreement that would
most likely be approved by the courts. It is primarily the unfair or grossly disproportionate allowance that is appealed and
such agreement is then often found unenforceable for more
than one reason. Thus it would seem improper to state that
absolutely all agreements dealing with alimony and support
will be found unenforceable in Illinois, especially in light of
the declared court policy to hold paramount the intent of the
parties to the agreement at the time of its making. But it can
be said that the courts will not favor such agreements as they
touch on a basic element of marriage, and that probably such
an agreement would not be enforced unless it provided for the
wife at least as well as she would be provided for without the
agreement.
The difficulty in attempting to ferret out the general law
applied by the courts is due to the emphasis placed on the
situation of the parties and to persons in like situations. The
management of the marriage relationship within certain bounds
71Id.; McClain's Estate v. McClain, 133 Ind. App. 645, 183 N.E.2d 842
(1962) ; Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956).
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is popularly thought to be none of the state's business. Hence
the unwillingness of courts in general to be involved in the
enforcement of agreements as to the religious and educational
training of children. Certain matters are best left to the parties themselves. Private agreements between parties to avoid
litigation are favored by the law and are also predominantly
favored in regard to the marital relation. It is only when the
agreement, in the light of the situation of the parties, has so
changed the marriage from that defined by law as to put one
party or the other in a relationship that cannot be recognized
as legally binding on him or her, that the court will interfere
with the enforcement of such an agreement. This may explain
why the court moves seemingly on an ad hoc basis in regard
to such cases, deciding them on the basis of the equities of a
particular factual situation. The major goal is that the marital
relation place the parties on as equal a footing as possible.
There is positive authority in Illinois for the following
propositions. A couple contemplating marriage may enter into
an antenuptial agreement altering the rights that either would
have in the property of the other by law because of the marriage. Each spouse may agree to hold his or her property as
if single.72 Under such an arrangement, either spouse should
be able to sell or give away his own property without the consent of the other, and to hold any rents or other income from
such individually owned land as his own property and to retain
the right to dispose of this property by will.
Either prospective spouse may agree with the other to
waive his or her rights to dower and statutory allowances that
he or she would otherwise receive upon the death of the other
by operation of law.73 This would prevent a wife, for example,
from claiming dower on a piece of land concerning which she
had not specifically waived her right of dower during her husband's life. This blanket antenuptial exclusion or waiver would
preclude her from claiming dower in any of the land her husband may have owned during the marriage.
An antenuptial agreement that is void in part may still be
given partial effect.74 It may be used as evidence of the intent
of the parties at the time they entered the agereement.75 It may
also be used as one of the considerations of the court in determining a matter before it, such as divorce or alimony.78 Also it
72

Long v. Barton, 236 Ill. 551, 68 N.E. 127 (1908) ; Hessick v. Hessick,

169 II. 486, 48 N.E. 712 (1897).
73 Note 49 supra.
7
4 Luttrell v. Boggs, 168 Ill. 361, 48 N.E.
75 Leyse v. Leyse, 251 Cal. App. 2d 629,
76 Moats v. Moats, 168 Colo. 120, 450
Strandberg, 33 Wis. 2d. 204, 147 N.W.2d 349

171 (1897).

59 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1967).
P.2d 64 (1969); Strandberg v.
(1967).
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appears Illinois follows the general principle that full effect may
still be given to the valid portion; for example, if a provision to
take effect upon the divorce of the parties were to be held void,
nevertheless upon the death of a spouse a provision to take effect then might still be wholly valid. 77
ILLINOIS THEORY OF ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

The same factors which are causing other jurisdictions to
reconsider their policies in regard to antenuptial agreements
are also at work in Illinois. The most challenging area, that of
antenuptial agreements in relation to divorce, has yet to be
fully met by the courts in this state. Usually once a decisive
case in this field is decided many similar cases arise. The importance of the factual setting in the situation presented for
adjudication leads to delicate differences between seemingly
similar cases. Due to the inherent complexities in weighing
these factual variables the courts often go to the law of other
states to find similar settings for a solution to the particular
problem before them. It seems likely, therefore, that when Illinois begins to enter this area the force of the decisions of
other states will be quite influential, especially due to the dearth
of Illinois cases on this particular subject.
A number of considerations indicate that the Illinois courts
may follow the more progressive states in regard to antenuptial
agreements in relation to divorce. These are: a highly favorable attitude toward antenuptial agreements in general; a presumption of validity for such agreements; the especially high
divorce rate in the state; concern shown for the equities of the
situation rather than formal correctness; priority of the court
to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement whenever possible.
The Illinois law at present seems similar in some respects
to that of the progressive states in this field, such as Kansas
and Florida,8 before premarital contracts in regard to divorce
were countenanced by the courts in those states. Such a decision in Illinois would not in itself be a radical departure from
current views, but rather a logical extension. Courts discussing the modern antenuptial cases seem to have little difficulty in
reconciling even the more advanced thinking with the traditional views. If the basic purposes behind the public policy are
kept in mind rather than the traditional requisites of antenup7

Note 71 supra.

Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ; Clark
v. Clark, 201 Okla. 134, 202 P.2d 990 (1949); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 1960).
78
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tial agreements, a liberalization of antenuptial contracts should
in no way upset current proprieties.
THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT

Attempts have been made to use an antenuptial agreement
to define certain conditions of the marital relationship, such as
specifying that children of a prior marriage shall not live with
the couple 79 where the couple shall live,8 0 the amount of support
from the husband which the wife shall receive while they are
married,8 and the religious and educational training of the
children that might result from the marriage9. 2 It may now be
said with some certainty that the courts will not usually enforce
such agreements. Logically it may be seen that such agreements would be very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce,
causing the courts to invade the privacy of the familial unit
and to keep a constant watch on the domestic life of the parties.
Also, as to religious covenants, to grant enforcement would
bring the courts very close to crossing the line between church
and state, albeit that the covenant had been voluntarily made
by the parties in relation to the upbringing of their children. 8
An antenuptial agreement may be effectively used to contract with the prospective spouse to make him or her the beneficiary of a will or an insurance policyA' Under certain circumstances even an oral agreement of this sort may be enforceable . 5 The antenuptial agreement, then, may be used to effect
changes in other contracts that preexisted the marriage. By
this method a spouse can be assured before the marriage that
certain provisions will be made by the other in regard to that
spouse's safety and security, and that a change of mind by the
other spouse during the marriage will not jeopardize that sense
of security, which may well have been one of the motives for
the marriage in the first place.
Equitable considerations and requirements are vital in
79 Mengal v. Mengal, 201 Misc. 104, 103 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Dona. Rel. Ct.
1951).
8oMarshak v. Marshak, 115 Ark. 51, 170 S.W. 567 (1914); Isaacs v.
71 Neb. 537, 99 N.W. 268 (1904).
Isaacs,
81
Notes 45 and 46 supra.
82 Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1957).
See also Comment, Civil Enforceability of Religious Antenuptial Agreements,
23 U. Cui. L. REv. 122 (1955).
83 Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954).
See also
Gans, Enforceability of Antenuptial Agreements for the Religious Education
of Children, 1 J. FAM. L. 227 (1961).
84 Genung v. Hagemann, 103 Ill. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968);
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Hoy, 174 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. I1. 1959);
In re Johnson, 202 Kan. 684, 452 P.2d 286 (1969) ; In re Zeitchick, 426 Pa.
171, 231 A.2d 131 (1967).
85 Genung v. Hagemann, 103 II. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968);
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Hoy, 174 ?. Supp. 859 (E.D, 1969).
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premarital contract cases, as usually the antenuptial agreement
is considered in equity. 6 If the spouse who has been treated
unfairly in the agreement waits too long before coming to court
to have the agreement declared void after the inequity has been
discovered, he or she may be denied relief due to laches or because of an implied ratification by him or her of the agreenientY7 However, for certain types of undue influence or fraud
in the procurement of the agreement, some courts have held
that the agreement was wholly void, that the wronged
spouse did not ratify by failing to come forth, and that the
spouse's reluctance to challenge the agreement may have been
justified by an interest in preserving marital tranquility.8 8
By taking or receiving certain benefits under the agreement the spouse may also be held to have waived his or her
right to challenge the agreement as invalid at a later time, if
when the benefits were taken, the spouse had or should have had
knowledge of the wrong committed on him or her by the other
spouse in regard to the agreement.8 9
Equitable considerations are often involved in regard to the
enforcement of antenuptial agreements since the agreements
are usually brought into play during the probate of an estate
where a spouse challenges the validity of the agreement as an
unconscionable contract, in order that he or she may take a
statutory share in the estate contrary to the agreement.90 Even
when the action is brought while both spouses are still alive,
due to the nature of the domestic relation the courts will apply
equitable standards to the agreement, especially due to the fiduciary relationship that usually precedes the making of the premarital contract between the parties because of their engagement to marry.9 1 Some states, though not Illinois, see every
contract entered into in contemplation of marriage as one which
takes on this highly fiduciary character, whether the couples
92
were engaged at the time or not.
If during the marriage the parties decide they no longer
need or desire the antenuptial agreement and its provisions,
S8Watson v.Watson, 5 Ill. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955); Anderson v.
Anderson, 354 Mass. 565, 238 N.E.2d 868 (1968).
8? In re Hart, 53 Misc. 2d 555, 279' N.Y.S,2d 119 (1967), aff'd, 30 App.
Div. 88
2d 781, 292 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1968).
In re Nelson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Cal. App. 1964); In re Grassman,
183 Neb. 147; 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968); In re Lemle, 55 Misc. 2d 640, 286
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1967).
89 Brown v. Brown, 329 Ill. 198, 160 N.E. 135 (1928).
Also, see generally In re Trecker, 107 Ill. App. 2d 94, 246 N.E.2d 56 (1969).
00Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 322, 133 A. 110 (1926).
91 Id.

92 Johnston v. Johnston, 134 Ind. App. 851, 184 N.E.2d 651 (1962);
Levy .v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945); Ortel v. Gettig, -207 Md.
594. 116,A.2d 145 (1955).
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they may by mutual consent rescind all or part of it.9
They
may also modify or alter it, again by mutual consent but, if a
third party is involved, that is, if he has been granted certain
rights under the agreement, or if certain rights have already
been vested in him, then they will need his consent as well in
order to rescind that part of the agreement that related to his
94
interest.
The divorce and subsequent remarriage of the parties to an
antenuptial agreement to each other will be held to negate the
original antenuptial agreement, the one made in regard to the
first marriage, insofar as the second marriage is concerned, except for the rights already vested in the spouse by virtue of
the first marriage. 95
There are situations recognized by the courts as having a
special need for antenuptial agreements concerning the rights
of the parties, as with older couples, couples entering second
and third marriages, cases where there are other dependents,
a great disparity in wealth between the prospective spouses,
a disparity in age or in health, or where the marriage would be
impracticable without some sort of premarital understanding. 6
DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS

When drafting an antenuptial agreement there are certain
factors which must be taken into consideration due to the, special nature of the agreement, the attitudes of the courts towards
its enforceability, and the circumstances of the parties in9
volved. 7
First and foremost, the agreement itself must be fair on its
face at the time that it is entered.98 The agreement must also
be fair or at least not unreasonably one-sided at the time it will
take effect. 9 The agreement must not go so far as to overreach
or to be indicative of unfair advantage or unreasonableness, or
of a lack of full and fair disclosure. ' If fraud or misrepresentation is used to secure the agreement, it may be held voidable
98 Campbell v. MeBurney, 201 Kan. 26, 439 P.2d 133 (1968); In re
Reed, 414 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1967).

94 Note 93 supra.
95 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 111. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
96 Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969).
Martin, 39 Ill.
App. 145 (1890).

Cf. Edwards v.

A. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §128 (4th ed. 1950).
98 Hessick v. Hessick, 169 11. 486, 48 N.E. 712 (1897); Mines v. Phee,
97 1

254 Ill. 60, 98 N.E. 260 (1912); Mudrock v. Murdock, 219 Il. 123, 76 N.E.
57 (1905); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1964); Kosick v.
George, 253 Ore. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969) ; In re Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244
A.2d199745
E.g.,(1968).
Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 ) 1906) ; In re
Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968).
. 100Mann v. Mann, 270 i11. 83, 110 N.E. 345 (1915); Slater v. Slater,
310 III. 454, 142 N.E. 177 (1924).
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by the innocent party.10 1 At all times the reasons and goals for
to both
the agreement must be kept in mind and be known
02
parties, to prevent either one from being misled.
It is of great importance to ascertain which state's laws
will govern when the agreement is sought to be enforced. In
the drafting of the agreement and its execution, all the laws

of the state in which it is to be executed must be met. 0 8 The
following items are of prime concern to the drafting attorney:
the conflict of laws implications ;104 income tax advantages ;105
of a gift tax ;106 estate and inthe possibility of the 1imposition
07
heritance tax matters.
It is necessary that a full disclosure of wealth be made to

be certain that the parties knew what rights they had and vol-8
untarily gave up those rights in the light of that knowledge.'1
To surrender a right without knowing its value or possible
worth would be unconscionable and unenforceable.' 09
There must be no undue influence by one spouse on the
other.'1 0 This may be a difficult requirement to meet inasmuch
as a person about to be married would usually tend to
be greatly influenced by the prospective spouse. It is prudent to

engage independent attorneys for each party to represent his or
her interest and to assure that both parties understand the full
101

This is because of the general contract principle that the defrauded

party may rectify the fraudulent transaction and enforce the contract which

would otherwise have been void due to the misrepresentation.

102 Genung v. Haaemann, 103 Ill. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968);
Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468, 148 N.E. 323 (1925); Mead v. Mead, 193 So.
2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1967).
103 Hill v. Hill, 262 A.2d 661 (Del. Chan. 1970), aff'd, 269 A.2d 212
(Del. Su. Ct. 1970).
104 For a general discussion on this point see Cathey, Ante-Nuptial
A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. REv. 275
Aarpeements in Arkansas (1970). This problem is magnified due to the greater mobility of families
in modern time and by the conflicting public policies concerning such agreements in the various states.
105 An example of a possible income tax advantage might be an agreement between the prospective spouses that if they should ever be divorced
payments to the wife should be characterized as alimony rather than as
support, allowinrr the husband the tax advantage of the deduction. As
support, he would only have been allowed the uniform tax deduction for
dependents.
106 Ellis v. Comm'r, 437 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1971), wherein after an
antenuptial agreement involving a trust had been ruled void under Arizona
law, the amount of the trust corpus was considered a gift to the wife for
tax purposes.
107 An antenuptial agreement to take effect upon the death of a party
should be considered as part of the entire estate plan, since it must be
complied with if valid in any disposition of the estate's assets.
108 Deholt v. Blackburn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790 (1928); Landes v.
Landes, 268 Il1. 11, 108 N.E. 691 (1915). Cf. In re Perelman, 458 Pa. 112,
263 A.2d 375 (1970).
100 Id.
110 Debolt v. Blackburn. 328 I1. 420, 159 N.E. 790 (1928); Petru v.
Petru, 4 Il1. App. 2d 1, 123 N.E.2d 352 (1954); Brown v. Brown. 265 S.W.2d
484 (Ky. 1954): Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945); In re
Knippel, 7 Wis. 2d 335, 96 N.W.2d 514.
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effect of the agreement and any and all circumstances that may
reasonably be expected to result from it.""
In proving the validity of the antenuptial agreement, the
agreement is presumed initially to be fair and fully enforceable,
and it is further presumed that full disclosure had been made,
with the burden on the challenging party to show otherwise.
However, if the provision for the challenging spouse was significantly disproportionate to the other spouse's wealth at the
time of the agreement, the burden shifts to the party seeking to
uphold the agreement to show it met all the requirements of
validity and that it had been agreed to after the required full
and fair disclosures of the extent of the respective spouse's
2
wealth had been made.1
Marriage itself provides a sufficient consideration for the
agreement, with the exchange of waivers or the giving of a sum
of money by one prospective spouse for the waiver of the other
also providing valid consideration. 1
There is a variety of interrelated factors that the courts
generally consider in ruling on the validity of the antenuptial
agreement in addition to the circumstances of the parties at
the time it is sought to be enforced or when its validity is ruled
upon. The ages of the parties relative to one another are considered,14 as well as age as indicative of a spouse no longer possessing the ability to support and care for him or herself."15
The business acumen, literacy, astuteness, intelligence, and like
factors of the parties at the time of the agreement are taken
into account to help determine whether one party took advantage of the other in securing consent to the agreement or in
overreaching the other." 6 The conditions under which the
agreement was made are considered to determine whether full
and fair disclosure was made to the other party, if there was
any undue influence, if there was time to consider the agreement in full and, in general, if the surrounding circumstances
were indicative of fraud or coercion either directly or indirectly
by one party on the other."' The relative wealth of the parties
is examined to see if the spouse's allotment is grossly dispro11

Note 65 supra.

112 Note 64 supra.
113 Edwards v. Martin, 32 Ill. App. 145 (1890); York v. Ferner, 59
Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882).
114 Megginson v. Meaginson, 367 Il1. 168. 10 N.E.2d 815 (1937); Parker
v. Gray, 317 I1. 468, 148 N.E. 323 (1925) ; Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143
So. 2d 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962); Bauer v. Bauer, 464 P.2d 710 (Ore. App.
1970). 5
1 See In re Kaufman, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961). Here the
Pennsylvania court considered many factors as relevant to the adequacy of
the settlement as well as the age and present ability of the surviving wife.
116 Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc. 199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967).
117 Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967).
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portionate to what would otherwise have been received.1', Some
courts use the measure of the adequacy of the settlement as the

prime criterion. 119
The nature of the premarital agreement is such that when

it is sought to be enforced or is challenged in the courts it is
usually some time after its execution, thus making it difficult

for the court to determine exactly what the conditions were
when it was entered into and to decide whether these conditions
were fair to both parties. The intent of the parties is especially
scrutinized, this becoming a major factor in the more recent
Illinois decisions. 20 A party will not be held to have waived or
surrendered any of his or her marital rights unless the intent
to do so is clearly made out in the agreement itself.' 21

Often the prior obligations of the parties may be held to
indicate the need for a rather severe antenuptial agreement that
might otherwise be rejected as unreasonable. This could arise,
for instance, if the husband had minor children from a prior
marriage for whom he wanted to assure proper provision was
22
made.1
The antenuptial agreement must meet all the requirements
of contract law in addition to all the special requirements due
2 3
to the nature of the marital relationship.
LIMITATIONS UPON ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
IN REGARD TO DIVORCE

There are five major reasons given by the courts for a
general refusal to enforce the types of antenuptial agreements

that deal with the consequences of the divorce or separation of
the parties:
1)
The inclusion of a clause in the agreement to take
effect upon the divorce of the parties shows bad faith
24
on the part of the parties in regard to the marriage.
In other words, by the agreement they belie the
"I Achilles v. Achilles, 151 Ill. 136, 37 N.E. 693 (1894); Taylor v.
Taylor, 144 Ill. 436, 33 N.E. 532 (1893).
11 In re Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1964) ; Thomas
v. Dancer, 264 P.2d 714 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1953); In re Knippel, 7 Wis. 2d
335, 96 N.W.2d 514 (1959).
120 Genung v. Hagemann 103 Ill. App. 2d 409, 242 N.E.2d 790 (1968);
Van Cura v. Drangelis, 43 ill. App. 2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 201 (1963).

121 Id.

122 Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962).
123Guhl v. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E.2d 185 (1941); Van Cura v.
Drangelis, 43 Ill. App. 2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 201 (1963); Barham v. Barham,
33 Cal. 2d 416, 202 P.2d 289 (1949); Northern Trust Co. v. King, 149 Fla.
611, 6 So. 2d 539 (1942); McClain's Estate v. McClain, 133 Ind. App. 645,
183 N.E.2d 842 (1962); Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 236 S.W. 3 (1921)';
Deller v. Deller, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N.W. 278 (1910).
124 See Ehlers v. Ehlers, 259 Ill. App. 142 (1930).
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2)

3)

4)

5)

necessary intent that the marriage be a permanent
contract which neither would try to jeopardize or
terminate.
To make an agreement contemplating divorce, reducing certain of the duties and obligations of either
spouse to the other, makes the marriage relation
other than what it is defined by law to be.1 25 No such
pseudo-marriage will be tolerated by the courts; each
marriage must include certain rights and duties between the spouses which are deemed essential to the
relationship itself. Hence, the parties will not be
allowed to waive these essential obligations, or alter
the basic nature of marriage as a lifetime contract.
An agreement made before marriage dealing with a
possible future divorce situation may increase the
chances of the parties seeking a divorce or even show
an intent by the parties that the marriage should
later terminate by divorce. Such agreements may be
126
held void as a matter of public policy.
It is sometimes held that upon the dissolution of the
marriage there has been a failure of the consideration
given for the antenuptial agreement, namely the marriage itself, rendering such an agreement no longer
2
enforceable.' 7
Some courts have held that the end of the marriage
also ends the effectiveness of the premarital agreement.12 8
The reasoning seems to be that the only
valid subject matter for the antenuptial agreement
was the marriage itself, and that when the court acted
to end the marriage all the agreements which were
dependent upon that marriage were canceled. The
point is that there can no longer be an antenuptial
agreement when there is no longer a marriage. Such
a view would certainly render moot the question of
antenuptial agreements in regard to divorce if adopted
by the courts as a whole.

The majority of the courts still cling to one or more of
these limiting doctrines, making it an uphill argument for
counsel to argue the enforceability of such agreements. Even
some of these courts, however, while not granting enforcement
Note 27 supn.
Ehlers v. Ehlers, 259 fI1. App. 142 (1930): Oliphant v. Oliphant,
177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928) ; In re Duncan, 87 Colo. 149, 285 P. 757
(1930); Kalsem v. Froland, 207 Iowa 993, 222 N.W. 3 (1928); Garlock v.
125

126

Garlock. 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939).
127 York v. Ferner, 59 Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882).
128 Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Il. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
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of such agreements, will allow them to be used as evidence or
be considered as part of the surrounding circumstances in the
determination of the amount of alimony to be awarded after
1 29

a divorce.

CHANGING TEMPER OF THE TIMES

-

A PROGNOSTICATION

The primary goal of domestic law in general is to make the
family and the marital relation in particular a more viable and
practicable situation. The high frequency of divorce would
seem to indicate that something is lacking in the current perspective of the law. The modern antenuptial agreement, to
gain stronger support from the courts and the legal community,
must be demonstrated to increase the viability and practicability of marriage, or else any real use and value for such
agreements will be marginal at best.
The first question in this regard is whether an antenuptial agreement can be used to increase the chances of a
marriage lasting, that is, actually reduce the chances of divorce. By agreeing in advance as to certain matters, even if
done informally, the parties can examine before marriage
those issues that may be most disruptive later. Indeed it would
seem advisable that couples visit a lawyer prior to marriage as
they would visit a doctor. The legal ramifications of their bond
may be at best vague to them. One advantage of the antenuptial conference is that these legal aspects are brought into focus with expert advice to both parties. Provisions can then be
made before time for the possible contingencies that may befall
the couple and their relationship.
The following factors would seem to indicate a compelling
need for a wider application of antenuptial agreements, even
those concerning divorce, to meet the exigencies of the times:
a general concern for the equity of a particular situation rather
than the application of purely formal rules; a broadened view
toward an individual's private life; the realization of the equality
of women with men both legally and economically ;18o an increasing tolerance for a variety of life styles; the reality of a soaring
divorce rate with an accompanying rise in the rate of second
and third marriages; a trend to marriage at a somewhat older
29

L

See Sack v. Sack, 184 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

130 The older cases unanimously hold that regardless of what independent

means of support the wife may have, the husband still bears the primary
obligation to support the wife due to the nature of the marital relation. This
common law liability is still recognized by most courts in the allowance of
alimony, though the extent of the wife's independent means is also a matter
for consideration. See generally, In re Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d
43 (1962); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964).
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age after a degree of economical security has already been
reached.
CONCLUSION
In family law in general equities weigh at least as heavily as
the law in any given situation. With antenuptial agreements
this is the case as well. But at present, especially with the traditional notion of the family being tried and tested beyond precedent, the theories behind the restrictive policies toward some antenuptial agreements are also being tried and tested. The position that the state will not countenance an agreement made in
anticipation of a possible separation or divorce begins to be considerably less tenable when the divorce rate reaches the level it
has in present times. In some states directly and in others more
indirectly a shift in emphasis can be observed. 31' What is of
primary importance is no longer the prevention of the parties
from seeking divorce, but rather that neither party be at a dis8 2
advantage in the marital situation because of the agreement.
The responsibility of the spouses for any children they might
have remains, as it should, beyond the reach of an antenuptial
agreement. These are rights which accrue to the child by virtue
of his birth and in no direct way arise from the agreement or
lack of agreement between the spouses. Any such agreement
could at best be auxiliary to the duty owed the child.31
It is time that this more reasonable approach be made a
matter of policy and not merely a guideline to be inferred from
the court's judgment of the equities. In frank terms, the marital
relation is no longer what it had been in the past. The chances
of a given marriage ending in divorce have increased greatly
and, it seems, probably will increase still more. To proscribe the
parties to a marriage from making any agreement as to this
very real possibility is to needlessly handicap their planning for
future contingencies.
The majority of the courts adhere to the more traditional
approach. 3 4 This may partly be due to the lawyers before them
arguing traditional law and attempting to fit their factual situa131 An analysis of this shift may be found in: Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163
So. 2d 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
182In re Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962); Englund v.
Englund, 286 Minn. 227, 175 N.W.2d 461 (1970).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §112 (1969).
See also Scholz v. Scholz, 85
Ill. App. 2d 201, 228 N.E.2d 202 (1967).
134Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Watson v.
Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y.
337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Hillman v. Hillman, 69 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1947);
Mottley v. Mottley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961) ; Fricke v. Fricke,
257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950); Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114
N.W. 820 (1908).
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tions into these established patterns. Also, the antenuptial
agreement is often merged into the divorce settlement by mutual
consent of the parties and never adjudicated by the court.
The more progressive courts treat the antenuptial agreement
in relation to divorce not unlike a separation agreement. 1 5 When
dealing with property, the conditions at the time agreement was
made are of utmost importance. When dealing with support, the
conditions of the parties at the time the divorce is sought are
also canvassed, that fairness may be preserved. 88 But the agreement is not rejected out of hand merely because it was made in
regard to divorce before the marriage.'5 7 The agreement became fully enforceable or matured upon the filing for divorce.
It should then be as valid as if the parties had entered the agreement at the time of filing for divorce, given that the other con138
siderations for a valid antenuptial agreement had all been met.
In this field especially the court's attitude depends on the
point of view taken as to the nature of the family, of marriage,
and of the state's role in the private lives of its citizens. As marriage is a definite and legally defined relationship; a relationship
even if called a marriage by the parties that is substantially different from that defined in law would not partake of the legal
characteristics and would thus be void. If it is a valid marriage,
the parties will not be allowed to alter it into something else by
private agreement between themselves. What is at issue is how
far the parties will be allowed to enter into private agreements
to alter these legal characteristics and still remain substantially
engaged in that relation defined by law.5 9 Of course, this in14 0
volves the balancing of public policy and individual interests.
In the past this balance has been tipped in favor of traditional
public policy at the expense of individual interests.
It has been the basic argument of this comment that a truer
balancing or equating of interests should take place, and that the
major interest of the state should only be that neither spouse
gain an unfair advantage over the other during the marriage.
Frank Rac
185 Like a divorce decree it is subject to review by the court to determine
if it is still just under changed circumstances of the parties, such as an
increase in the need for support by the wife since the agreement had been
entered.
This more progressive attitude is well brought out in Posner v. Posner,
233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1970), at 386, where it was held that an antenuptial agreement entered into under conditions as outlined in this article
would be "a valid and binding agreement between the parties at the time and
under the conditions it was made but subject to be increased or decreased
under changed conditions ....(as provided by law)."
188 Note 78 supra.
1s7 Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1960).
188 Note 78 supra.
189
Note 60 supra.
L40 Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1970).

